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Abstract
Pretrained models from self-supervision are prevalently
used in fine-tuning downstream tasks faster or for better
accuracy. However, gaining robustness from pretraining is
left unexplored. We introduce adversarial training into self-
supervision, to provide general-purpose robust pretrained
models for the first time. We find these robust pretrained
models can benefit the subsequent fine-tuning in two ways:
i) boosting final model robustness; ii) saving the compu-
tation cost, if proceeding towards adversarial fine-tuning.
We conduct extensive experiments to demonstrate that the
proposed framework achieves large performance margins
(e.g., 3.83% on robust accuracy and 1.3% on standard ac-
curacy, on the CIFAR-10 dataset), compared with the con-
ventional end-to-end adversarial training baseline. More-
over, we find that different self-supervised pretrained models
have diverse adversarial vulnerability. It inspires us to en-
semble several pretraining tasks, which boosts robustness
more. Our ensemble strategy contributes to a further im-
provement of 3.59% on robust accuracy, while maintaining
a slightly higher standard accuracy on CIFAR-10. Our codes
are available at https://github.com/TAMU-VITA/
Adv-SS-Pretraining.
1. Introduction
Supervised training of deep neural networks requires mas-
sive, labeled datasets, which may be unavailable and costly
to assemble [15, 2, 28, 36]. Self-supervised and unsuper-
vised training techniques attempt to address this challenge
by eliminating the need for manually labeled data. Represen-
tations pretrained through self-supervised techniques enable
fast fine-tuning to multiple downstream tasks, and lead to
better generalization and calibration [20, 23]. Examples of
tasks proven to attain high accuracy through self-supervised
pretraining include position predicting tasks (Selfie [35], Jig-
saw [25, 3]), rotation predicting tasks (Rotation [9]), and a
variety of other perception tasks [6, 41, 8].
The labeling and sample efficiency challenges of deep
learning are further exacerbated by vulnerability to adver-
sarial attacks. For example, Convolutional Neural Networks
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Figure 1: Summary of our achieved performance (CIFAR-10).
The upper right corner indicates the best performance in
terms of both standard and robust accuracy. The size of mark-
ers represents the number of training epochs to achieve the best
robust accuracy. Black circle (•) is the baseline method: end-to-end
adversarial training. Blue circles (•) are fine-tuned models that in-
herit robust models from different self-supervised pretraining tasks.
Orange circle (•) is the ensemble of three self-supervised pretrain-
ing tasks. Red Star (H) is the ensemble of three fine-tuned models.
The correspondence between themarker size and # epochs is given
by, Ensemble Fine-tune (H, 144 epochs) > Baseline (•, 99 epochs)
> Ensemble Pretrain (•, 56 epochs) > Selfie (•, 50 epochs) >
Jigsaw (•, 48 epochs) > Rotation (•, 46 epochs)
(CNNs), are widely leveraged for perception tasks, due to
high predictive accuracy. However, even a well-trained CNN
suffers from high misclassification rates when imperceivable
perturbations are applied the input [18, 24]. As suggested by
[30], the sample complexity of learning an adversarially ro-
bust model with current methods is significantly higher than
that of standard learning. Adversarial training (AT) [21], the
state-of-the-art model defense approach, is also known to be
computationally more expensive than standard training (ST).
The above facts make it especially meaningful to explore:
Can appropriately pretrained models play a similar
role for adversarial training as they have for ST?
That is, can they lead to more efficient fine-tuning
and better, adversarially-robust generalization?
Self-supervision has only recently been linked to the study
of robustness. An approach is offered in [14], by incorporat-
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ing the self-supervised task as a complementary objective,
which is co-optimized with the conventional classification
loss through the method of AT [21]. Their co-optimization
approach presents scalability challenges, and does not enjoy
the benefits of pretrained embeddings. Further, it leaves
many unanswered questions, especially with respect to effi-
cient tuning, which we tackle in this paper.
Contributions. This paper introduces a framework for
self-supervised pretraining and fine-tuning into the adversar-
ial robustness field. We motivate our study with the follow-
ing three scientific questions:
Q1: Is an adversarially pretrained model effective in boost-
ing the robustness of subsequent fine-tuning?
Q2: Which provides the better accuracy and efficiency: ad-
versarial pretraining or adversarial fine-tuning?
Q3: How does the type of self-supervised pretraining task
affect the final model’s robustness?
Our contributions address the above questions and can be
summarized as follows:
A1: We demonstrate for the first time that robust pretrained
models leveraged for adversarial fine-tuning result in
a large performance gain. As illustrated by Figure 1,
the best pretrained model from a single self-supervised
task (Selfie) leads to 3.83% on robust accuracy1 and
1.3% on standard accuracy on CIFAR-10 when being
adversarially fine-tuned, compared with the strong AT
baseline. Even performing standard fine-tuning (which
consumes fewer resources) with the robust pretrained
models improves the resulting model’s robustness.
A2: We systematically study all possible combinations be-
tween pretraining and fine-tuning. Our extensive results
reveal that adversarial fine-tuning contributes to the
dominant portion of robustness improvement, while
robust pretraining mainly speeds up adversarial fine-
tuning. That can also be read from Figure 1 (smaller
marker sizes denote less training epochs needed).
A3: We experimentally show that the pretrained models re-
sulting from different self-supervised tasks have diverse
adversarial vulnerabilities. In view of that, we propose
to pretrain with an ensemble of self-supervised tasks,
in order to leverage their complementary strengths. On
CIFAR-10, our ensemble strategy further contributes
to an improvement of 3.59% on robust accuracy, while
maintaining a slightly higher standard accuracy. Our
1Throughout this paper, we follow [40] to adopt their defined standard
accuracy and robust accuracy, as two metrics to evaluate our method’s
effectiveness: a desired model shall be high in both.
approach establishes a new benchmark result on stan-
dard accuracy (86.04%) and robust accuracy (54.64%)
in the setting of AT.
2. Related Work
Self-supervised pretraining. Numerous self-supervised
learning methods have been developed in recent years, in-
cluding: region/component filling (e.g. inpainting [6] and
colorization [41]); rotation prediction [9]; category predic-
tion [8]; and patch-base spatial composition prediction (e.g.,
Jigsaw [25, 3] and Selfie [35]). All perform standard train-
ing, and do not tackle adversarial robustness. For example,
Selfie [35], generalizes BERT to image domains. It masks
out a few patches in an image, and then attempts to clas-
sify a right patch to reconstruct the original image. Selfie is
first pretrained on unlabeled data and fine-tuned towards the
downstream classification task.
Adversarial robustness. Many defense methods have
been proposed to improve model robustness against adversar-
ial attacks. Approaches range from adding stochasticity [7],
to label smoothening and feature squeezing [27, 38], to de-
noising and training on adversarial examples [22, 19]. A
handful of recent works point out that those empirical de-
fenses could still be easily compromised [1]. Adversarial
training (AT) [21] provides one of the strongest current de-
fenses, by training the model over the adversarially perturbed
training data, and has not yet been fully compromised by new
attacks. [10, 16] showed AT is also effective in compress-
ing or accelerating models [42] while preserving learned
robustness.
Several works have demonstrated model ensembles
[32, 34] to boost adversarial robustness, as the ensemble
diversity can challenge the transferability of adversarial ex-
amples. Recent proposals [26, 37] formulate the diversity as
a training regularizer for improved ensemble defense. Their
success inspires our ensembled self-supervised pretraining.
Unlabeled data for adversarial robustness. Self-
supervised training learns effective representations for
improving performance on downstream tasks, without
requiring labels. Because robust training methods have
higher sample complexity, there has been significant recent
attention on how to effectively utilize unlabeled data to train
robust models.
Results show that unlabeled data can become a compet-
itive alternative to labeled data for training adversarially
robust models. These results are concurred by [39], who
also finds that learning with more unlabeled data can result
in better adversarially robust generalization. Both works
[31, 4] use unlabeled data to form an unsupervised auxil-
iary loss (e.g., a label-independent robust regularizer or a
pseudo-label loss).
To the best of our knowledge, [14] is the only work so
far that utilizes unlabeled data via self-supervision to train
a robust model given a target supervised classification task.
It improves AT by leveraging the rotation prediction self-
supervision as an auxiliary task, which is co-optimized with
the conventional AT loss. Our self-supervised pretraining
and fine-tuning differ from all above settings.
3. Our Proposal
In this section, we introduce self-supervised pretraining to
learn feature representations from unlabeled data, followed
by fine-tuning on a target supervised task. We then gener-
alize adversarial training (AT) to different self-supervised
pretraining and fine-tuning schemes.
3.1. Setup
Self-Supervised Pretraining Let Tp denote a pretraining
task and Dp denote the corresponding (unlabeled) pretrain-
ing dataset. The goal of self-supervised pretraining is to learn
a model from Dp itself without explicit manual supervision.
This is often cast as an optimization problem, in which a
proposed pretraining loss `p(θp,θpc;Dp) is minimized to
determine a model parameterized by θp. Here θpc signifies
additional parameters customized for a given Tp. In the rest
of the paper, we focus on the following self-supervised pre-
training tasks (details on each pretraining task are provided
in the supplement):
Selfie [35]: By masking out select patches in an image,
Selfie constructs a classification problem to determine the
correct patch to be filled in the masked location.
Rotation [9]: By rotating an image by a random multiple
of 90 degrees, Rotation constructs a classification problem to
determine the degree of rotation applied to an input image.
Jigsaw [25, 3]: By dividing an image into different
patches, Jigsaw trains a classifier to predict the correct per-
mutation of these patches.
Supervised Fine-tuning Let r(x;θp) denote the mapping
(parameterized by θp) from an input sample x to its embed-
ding space learnt from the self-supervised pretraining task
Tp. Given a target finetuning task Tf with the labeled dataset
Df , the goal of fine-tuning is to determine a classifier, param-
eterized by θf , which maps the represetnation r(x;θp) to the
label space. To learn the classifier, one can minimize a com-
mon supervised training loss `f(θp,θf ;Df) with a fixed or
re-trainable model θp, corresponding to partial fine-tuning
and full fine-tuning, respectively.
AT versus standard training (ST) AT is known as one of
the most powerful methods to train a robust classifier against
adversarial attacks [21, 1]. Considering an -tolerant `∞
attack δ subject to ‖δ‖∞ ≤ , an adversarial example of a
benign input x is given by x+ δ. With the aid of adversarial
examples, AT solves a min-max optimization problem of the
generic form
minimize
θ
Ex∈D
[
maximize
‖δ‖∞≤
`(θ,x+ δ)
]
, (1)
where θ denotes the parameters of an ML/DL model, D is a
given dataset, and ` signifies a classification loss evaluated
at the model θ and the perturbed input x + δ. By fixing
δ = 0, problem (1) then simplifies to the ST framework
minimizeθ Ex∈D [`(θ,x)].
3.2. AT meets self-supervised pretraining and fine-
tuning
AT given by (1) can be specified for either self-supervised
pretraining or supervised fine-tuning. For example, AT for
self-supervised pretraining can be cast as problem (1) by
letting θ := [θTp ,θ
T
pc]
T and D := Dp, and specifying ` as
`p. In Table 1, we summarize all the possible scenarios when
AT meets self-supervised pretraining.
Table 1: Summary of self-supervised pretraining scenarios.
Scenario
Pretraining
method Loss ` in (1) Variables θ in (1)
dataset
D in (1)
P1 None1 NA2 NA NA
P2 ST3 `p [θTp ,θTpc]T Dp
P3 AT `p [θTp ,θTpc]T Dp
1 None: the model form of θp is known in advance.
2 NA: Not applicable.
3 ST: A special case of (1) with δ = 0.
Table 2: Summary of fine-tuning scenarios.
Scenario
Fine-tuning
type
Fine-tuning
method
Loss
` in (1)
Variables
θ in (1)
dataset
D in (1)
F1 Partial(with fixed θp)1 ST `f θf Df
F2 Partial(with fixed θp) AT `f θf Df
F3 Full2 ST `f [θTp ,θTf ]T Df
F4 Full AT `f [θTp ,θTf ]T Df
1 Fixed θ∗p signifies the model learnt in a given pretraining scenario.
2 Full fine-tuning retrains θp.
Given a pretrained model θp, adversarial fine-tuning
could have two forms: a) AT for partial fine-tuning and
b) AT for full fine-tuning. Here the former case a) solves
a supervised fine-tuning task under the fixed model (θp),
and the latter case b) solves a supervised fine-tuning task by
retraining θp. In Table 2, we summarize different scenarios
when AT meets supervised fine-tuning.
It is worth noting that our study on the integration of AT
with a pretraining+fine-tuning scheme (Pi,Fj) provided by
Tables 1-2 is different from [14], which conducted one-shot
AT over a supervised classification task integrated with a
rotation self-supervision task.
In order to explore the network robustness against dif-
ferent configurations {(Pi,Fj)}, we ask: is AT for robust
pretraining sufficient to boost the adversarial robustness of
fine-tuning? What is the influence of fine-tuning strategies
(partial or full) on the adversarial robustness of image clas-
sification? How does the type of self-supervised pretraining
task affect the classifier’s robustness?
We provide detailed answers to the above questions in
Sec. 4.3, Sec. 4.4 and Sec. 4.5. In a nutshell, we find that
robust representation learnt from adversarial pretraining is
transferable to down-stream fine-tuning tasks to some ex-
tent. However, a more significant robustness improvement is
obtained by adversarial fine-tuning. Moreover, AT for full
fine-tuning outperforms that for partial fine-tuning in terms
of both robust accuracy and standard accuracy (except the
Jigsaw-specified self-supervision task). Furthermore, dif-
ferent self-supervised tasks demonstrate diverse adversarial
vulnerability. As will be evident later, such diversified tasks
provide complementary benefits to model robustness and
therefore can be combined.
3.3. AT by leveraging ensemble of multiple self-
supervised learning tasks
In what follows, we generalize AT to learn a robust pre-
trained model by leveraging the diversified pretraining tasks.
More specifically, consider M self-supervised pretraining
tasks {T (i)p }Mi=1, each of which obeys the formulation in
Section 3.1. We generalize problem (1) to
minimize
θr,{θ(i)pc }
Ex∼Dp
[
Ladv(θp, {θ(i)pc },x)
]
, (2)
where Ladv denotes the adversarial loss given by
Ladv(θp, {θ(i)pc },x)
:= maximize
{‖δ(i)‖∞≤}
M∑
i=1
`(i)p (θp,θ
(i)
pc ,x+ δ
(i))
+ λg(θp, {θ(i)pc }, {δ(i)}). (3)
In (2), for ease of notation, we replace {·}Mi=1 with {·}, θp
denotes the common network shared among different self-
supervised tasks, and θ(i)pc denotes a sub-network customized
for the ith task. We refer readers to Figure 2 for an overview
of our proposed model architecture. In (3), `(i)p denotes the
ith pretraining loss, g denotes a diversity-promoting regu-
larizer, and λ ≥ 0 is a regularization parameter. Note that
λ = 0 gives the averaging ensemble strategy. In our case,
we perform grid search to tune λ around the value chosen in
[26]. Details are referred to the supplement.
Spurred by [26, 37], we quantify the diversity-promoting
regularizer g through the orthogonality of input gradients of
different self-supervised pretraining losses,
g(θp, {θ(i)pc }, {δ(i)}) := log det(GTG), (4)
where each column of G corresponds to a normalized in-
put gradient {∇δi`(i)p (θp,θ(i)pc ,x+ δ(i))}, and g reaches the
maximum value 0 as input gradients become orthogonal,
otherwise it is negative. The rationale behind the diversity-
promoting adversarial loss (3) is that we aim to design a
robust model θp by defending attacks from diversified per-
turbation directions.
4. Experiments and Results
In this section, we design and conduct extensive experi-
ments to examine the network robustness against different
configurations {(Pi,Fj)} for image classification. First, we
show adversarial self-supervised pretraining (namely, P3
in Table 1) improves the performance of downstream tasks.
We also discuss the influence of different fine-tuning strate-
gies Fj on the adversarial robustness. Second, we show the
diverse impacts of different self-supervised tasks on their
resulting pretrained models. Third, we ensemble those self-
supervised tasks to perform adversarial pretraining. At the
fine-tuning phase, we also ensemble three best models with
the configuration (P3, F4) and show its performance superi-
ority. Last, we report extensive ablation studies to reveal the
influence of the size of the datasets Dp and the resolution of
images in Dp, as well as other defense options beyond AT.
4.1. Datasets
Dataset Details We consider four different datasets in
our experiments: CIFAR-10, CIFAR-10-C [13], CIFAR-100
and R-ImageNet-224 (a specifically constructed “restricted”
version of ImageNet, with resolution 224 × 224). For the
last one, we indeed to demonstrate our approach on high-
resolution data despite the computational challenge. We
follow [29] to choose 10 super classes which contain a total
of 190 ImageNet classes. The detailed classes distribution
of each super class can be found in our supplement.
For the ablation study of different pretraining dataset
sizes, we sample more training images from the 80 Million
Tiny Images dataset [33] where CIFAR-10 was selected from.
Using the same 10 super classes, we form CIFAR-30K (i.e.,
30,000 for images), CIFAR-50K, CIFAR-150K for training,
and keep another 10,000 images for hold-out testing.
Dataset Usage In Sec. 4.3, Sec. 4.4 and Sec. 4.5, for all re-
sults, we use CIFAR-10 training set for both pretraining and
fine-tuning. We evaluate our models on the CIFAR-10 testing
set and CIFAR-10-C. In Sec. 4.6, we use CIFAR-10, CIFAR-
30K, CIFAR-50K, CIFAR-150K and R-ImageNet-224 for
pretraining, and CIFAR-10 training set for fine-tuning, while
evaluating on CIFAR-10 testing set. We also validate our
approaches on CIFAR-100 in the supplement. In all of our
experiments, we randomly split the original training set into
a training set and a validation set (the ratio is 9:1).
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Figure 2: The overall framework of ensemble adversarial pretraining. The pretrained weights θp are the first three blocks of ResNet-50v2
[11]; Green arrows (Ô), Blue arrows (Ô) and Red arrows (Ô) represent the feed forward paths of Selfie, Jigsaw and Rotation, respectively.
4.2. Implementation Details
Model Architecture: For pretraining with the Selfie task,
we identically follow the setting in [35]. For Rotation and
Jigsaw pretraining tasks, we use ResNet-50v2 [12]. For the
fine-tuning, we use ResNet-50v2 for all. Each fine-tuning
network will inherit the corresponding robust pretrained
weights to initialize the first three blocks of ResNet-50v2,
while leaving the remaining blocks randomly initialized.
Training & Evaluation Details: All pretraining and fine-
tuning tasks are trained using SGD with 0.9 momentum. We
use batch sizes of 256 for CIFAR-10, ImageNet-32 and 64
for R-ImageNet-224. All pretraining tasks adopt cosine
learning rates. The maximum and minimum learning rates
are 0.1 and 10−6 for Rotation and Jigsaw pretraining; 0.025
and 10−6 for Selfie pretraining; and 0.001 and 10−8 for
ensemble pretraining. All fine-tuning phases follow a multi-
step learning rate schedule, starting from 0.1 and decayed by
10 times at epochs 30 and 50 for a 100 epochs training.
We use 10-step and 20-step `∞ PGD attacks [21] for
adversarial training and evaluation, respectively. Unless
otherwise specified, we follow [14]’s setting with  = 8.0225
and α = 2.0255 . For all adversarial evaluations, we use the
full testing datasets (i.e 10, 000 images for CIFAR-10) to
generate adversarial images. We also consider unforeseen
attacks [17, 13].
Evaluation Metrics & Model Picking Criteria: We fol-
low [40] to use: i) Standard Testing Accuracy (TA): the
classification accuracy on the clean test dataset; II) Robust
Testing Accuracy (RA): the classification accuracy on the
attacked test dataset. In our experiments, we use TA to pick
models for a better trade-off with RA. Results of models
picked using RA criterion are included in the supplement.
4.3. Adversarial self-supervised pertraining & fine-
tuning helps classification robustness
We systematically study all possible configurations of
pretraining and fine-tuning considered in Table 1 and Ta-
ble 2, where recall that the expression (Pi,Fj) denotes
a specified pretraining+fine-tuning scheme. The baseline
schemes are given by the end-to-end standard training (ST),
namely, (P1,F3) and the end-to-end adversarial training
(AT), namely, (P1,F4). Table 3 shows TA, RA, and itera-
tion complexity of fine-tuning (in terms of number of epochs)
under different pretraining+fine-tuning strategies involving
different self-supervised pretraining tasks, Selfie, Rotation
and Jigsaw. In what follows, we analyze the results of Ta-
ble 3 and provide additional insights.
We begin by focusing on the scenario of integrating the
standard pretraining strategy P2 with fine-tuning schemes
F3 and F4 used in baseline methods. Several observations
can be made from the comparison (P2,F3) vs. (P1,F3)
and (P2,F4) vs. (P1,F4) in Table 3. 1) The use of self-
supervised pretraining consistently improves TA and/or RA
even if only standard pretraining is conducted; 2) The use of
adversarial fine-tuning F4 (against standard fine-tuning F3)
is crucial, leading to significantly improved RA under both
P1 and P2; 3) Compared (P1,F4) with (P2,F4), the use
of self-supervised pretraining offers better eventual model
robustness (around 3% improvement) and faster fine-tuning
speed (almost saving the half number of epochs).
Next, we investigate how the adversarial pretraining
(namely, P3) affects the eventual model robustness. It is
shown by (P3,F1) and (P3,F2) in Table 3 that the robust
feature representation learnt from P3 benefits adversarial
robustness even in the case of partial fine-tuning, but the use
of adversarial partial fine-tuning, namely, (P3,F2), yields
a 30% more improvement. We also observe from the case
of (P3,F3) that the standard full fine-tuning harms the ro-
Table 3: Evaluation Results of Eight Different (Pi,Fj) Scenarios. Table 1 and Table 2 provide detailed definitions for P1 (without
pre-training), P2 (standard self-supervision pre-training), P3 (adversarial self-supervision pre-training), F1 (partial standard fine-tuning),
F2 (partial adversarial fine-tuning), F3 (full standard fine-tuning), and F4 (full adversarial fine-tuning). The best results are highlighted
(1st,2nd) under each column of different self-supervised pretraining tasks.
Scenario Selfie Pretraining Rotation Pretraining Jigsaw PretrainingTA (%) RA (%) Epochs TA (%) RA (%) Epochs TA (%) RA (%) Epochs
(P1,F3) 94.24 0.00 92 94.24 0.00 92 94.24 0.00 92
(P1,F4) 84.72 47.22 99 84.72 47.22 99 84.72 47.22 99
(P2,F3) 95.09 0.00 97 95.45 0.00 92 93.93 0.00 89
(P2,F4) 85.56 50.42 60 86.66 50.95 45 85.18 50.94 46
(P3,F1) 78.93 6.30 82 86.83 18.22 99 80.47 2.68 87
(P3,F2) 74.30 37.65 64 82.32 45.10 47 72.76 32.59 51
(P3,F3) 94.69 0.00 86 94.79 0.00 92 93.06 0.00 93
(P3,F4) 86.02 51.05 50 85.66 50.40 46 84.50 49.61 48
bust feature representation learnt from P3, leading to 0%
RA. Furthermore, when the adversairal full fine-tuning is
adopted, namely, (P3,F4), the most significant robustness
improvement is acquired. This observation is consistent with
(P2,F4) against (P2,F3).
Third, at the first glance, adversarial full fine-tuning
(namely, F4) is the most important step to improve the final
mode robustness. However, adversarial pretraining is also a
key, particularly for reducing the computation cost of fine-
tuning; for example, less than 50 epochs in (P3,F4) vs. 99
epochs in the end-to-end AT (P1,F4).
Last but not the least, we note that the aforementioned
results are consistent against different self-supervised pre-
diction tasks. However, Selfie and Rotation are more favored
than Jigsaw to improve the final model robustness. For exam-
ple, in the cases of adversarial pretraining followed by stan-
dard and adversarial partial fine-tuning, namely, (P3,F1)
and (P3,F2), Selfie and Rotation yields at least 3.5% im-
provement in RA. As the adversarial full fine-tuning is used,
namely, (P3,F4), Selfie and Rotation outperform Jigsaw in
both TA and RA, where Selfie yields the largest improvement,
around 2.5% in both TA and RA.
4.4. Comparison with one-shot AT regularized by
self-supervised prediction task
In what follows, we compare our proposed adversarial
pretraining followed by adversarial fine-tuning approach,
namely, (P3, F4) in Table 3 with the one-shot AT that opti-
mizes a classification task regularized by the self-supervised
rotation prediction task [14]. In addition to evaluating this
comparison in TA and RA (evaluated at `∞ PGD attack
[21]), we also measure the robustness in eventual classifica-
tion against 12 unforeseen attacks that are not used in AT
[17]. More results can be found in the supplement.
Figure 3 presents the multi-dimensional performance
comparison of our approach vs. the baseline method in [14].
As we can see, our approach yields 1.97% improvement on
TA while 0.74% degradation on RA. However, our approach
yields consistent robustness improvement in defending all
12 unforeseen attacks, where the improvement ranges from
1.03% to 6.53%. Moreover, our approach separates pre-
training and fine-tuning such that the target image classifier
can be learnt from a warm start, namely, the adversarial
pretrained representation network. This mitigates the com-
putation drawback of one-shot AT in [14], recalling that our
advantage in saving computation cost was shown in Table 3.
Next, Figure 4 presents the performance of our approach
under different types of self-supervised prediction task. As
we can see, Selfie provides consistently better performance
than others, where Jigsaw performs the worst.
Figure 3: The summary of the accuracy over unforeseen adversar-
ial attackers. Our models are obtained after adversarial fine-tuning
with adversarial Rotation pretraining. Baseline are co-optimized
models with Rotation auxiliary task [14].
Figure 4: The summary of the accuracy over unforeseen adversar-
ial attackers. Competition among adversarial fine-tuned models
with Selfie, Rotation and Jigsaw adversarial pretraining.
4.5. Diversity vs. Task Ensemble
In what follows, we show that different self-supervised
prediction tasks demonstrate a diverse adversarial vulnera-
bility even if their corresponding RAs remain similar. We
evaluate such a diversity through the transferability of adver-
sarial examples generated from robust classifiers fine-tuned
from the adversarially pretrained models using different self-
supervised prediction tasks. We then demonstrate the perfor-
mance of our proposed adversarial pretraining method (2)
by leveraging an ensemble of Selfie, Rotation, and Jigsaw.
In Table 4, we present the transferbility of PGD attacks
generated from the final model trained using adversarial
pretraining followed by adversarial full fine-tuning, namely,
(P3,F4), where for ease of presentation, let Model(t) de-
note the classifier learnt using the self-supervised pretraining
task t ∈ {Selfie, rotation, Jigsaw}. Given the PGD attacks
from Model(t), we evaluate their transferbility, in terms of
attack success rate (ASR2), against Model(t′). If t′ = t,
then ASR reduces to 1 − RA. If t′ 6= t, then ASR reflects
the attack transferbility from Model(t) to Model(t′). As
we can see, the diagonal entries of Table 4 correspond to
the largest ASR at each column. This is not surprising,
since transferring to another model makes the attack being
weaker. One interesting observation is that ASR suffers a
larger drop when transferring attacks from Model(Jigsaw)
to other target models. This implies that Model(Selfie) and
Model(Rotation) yields better robustness, consistent with
our previous results like Figure 4.
At the first glance, the values of ASR of transfer attacks
from Model(t) to Model(t′) (t′ 6= t) keep similar, e.g., the
first column of Table 4 where t = Selfie and t′ = Rotation
(38.92% ASR) or t′ = Jigsaw (38.96% ASR). However,
2ASR is given by the ratio of successful adversarial examples over the
total number of 10, 000 test images.
Figure 5 shows that the seemingly similar transferability
are built on more diverse adversarial examples that suc-
ceed to attack Model(Rotation) and Model(Jigsaw), respec-
tively. As we can see, there exist at least 14% transfer ex-
amples that are non-overlapped when successfully attacking
Model(Rotation) and Model(Jigsaw). This diverse distri-
bution of transferred adversarial examples against models
using different self-supervised pretraining tasks motivates us
to further improve the robustness by leveraging an ensemble
of diversified pretraining tasks.
In Figure 2, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our pro-
posed adversarial pretraining via diversity-promoted ensem-
ble (AP + DPE) given in (2). Here we consider 4 baseline
methods: 3 single task based adversarial pretraining, and
adversarial pretraining via standard ensemble (AP + SE), cor-
responding to λ = 0 in (2). As we can see in Table 5, AP +
DPE yields at least 1.17% improvement on RA while at most
3.02% degradation on TA, comparing with the best single
fine-tuned model. In addition to the ensemble at the pretrain-
ing stage, we consider a simple but the most computationally
intensive ensemble strategy, an averaged predictions over
three final robust models learnt using adversarial pretrain-
ing P3 followed by adversarial fine-tuning F4 over Selfie,
rotation, and Jigsaw. As we can see in Table 6, the best
combination, ensemble of three fine-tuned models, yields at
least 3.59% on RA while maintains a slight higher TA. More
results of other ensemble configurations can be found in the
supplement.
Table 4: The vulnerability diversity among fine-tuned models with
Selfie, Rotation and Jigsaw self-supervised adversarial pretraining.
The results take full adversarial fine-tuning. The highest ASRs
are highlighted (1st,2nd) under each column of PGD attacks from
different fine-tuned models. Ensemble model results to different
PGD attacks can be found in our supplement.
Evaluation
(P3,F4) Attack PGD attacks
from
Model(Selfie)
PGD attacks
from
Model(Rotation)
PGD attacks
from
Model(Jigsaw)
Model(Selfie) 48.95% 37.75% 36.65%
Model(Rotaion) 38.92% 49.60% 38.12%
Model(Jigsaw) 38.96% 39.56% 51.17%
4.6. Ablation Study and Analysis
For comparison fairness, we fine-tune all models in the
same CIFAR-10 dataset. In each ablation, we show results
under scenarios (P3,F2) and (P3,F4), where P3 represents
adversarial pretraining, F2 represents partial adversarial fine-
tuning and F4 represents full adversarial fine-tuning. More
ablation results can be found in the supplement.
Ablation of the pretraining data size As shown in Ta-
ble 7, as the pretraining dataset grows larger, the standard
Successful Transfer Attacks 
both on Model(Rotation) and
Model(Jigsaw)
14.09% 14.00%
Successful Transfer Attacks
only on Model(Rotation)
Successful Transfer Attacks
only on Model(Jigsaw)
Figure 5: The VENN plot between sets of successful transfer
adversarial examples from Model(Selfie) to Model(Rotation) and
Model(Selfie) to Model(Jigsaw). The overlapping Brown area (n)
represents the successful transfer attacks both on Model(Rotation)
and Model(Jigsaw) from Model(Selfie). The Pink area (n) repre-
sents the successful transfer attacks only on Model(Jigsaw) from
ModelSelfie. The Green area (n) represents the successful transfer
attacks only on Model(Rotation) from Model(Selfie).
Table 5: Results comparison between fine-tuned model from sin-
gle task pretraining and fine-tuned model from tasks ensemble
pretraining. AP + SE represents adversarial pretraining via stan-
dard ensemble. AP + DPE represents adversarial pretraining via
diversity-promoted ensemble. The best results are highlighted
(1st,2nd) under each column of evaluation metrics.
Models TA (%) RA (%) Epochs
Selfie Pretraining 86.02 51.05 50
Rotation Pretraining 85.66 50.40 46
Jigsaw Pretraining 83.74 48.83 48
AP + SE 84.44 49.53 47
AP + DPE 83.00 52.22 56
Table 6: Ensemble results of fine-tuned models with different
adversarial pretrainings. The best results are highlighted (1st,2nd)
under each column of evaluation metrics.
Fine-tuned Models (P3,F4) TA (%) RA (%)
Jigsaw + Rotation 85.36 53.08
Jigsaw + Selfie 85.64 53.32
Rotation + Selfie 86.51 53.83
Jigsaw + Rotation + Selfie 86.04 54.64
and robust accuracies both demonstrate steady growth. Un-
der the (P3,F4) scenario, when the pretraining data size
increases from 30K to 150K, we observe a 0.97% gain on ro-
bust accuracy with nearly the same standard accuracy. That
aligns with the existing theory [30]. Since self-supervised
pretraining requires no label, we could in future grow the
unlabeled data size almost for free to continuously boost the
pretraining performance.
Table 7: Ablation results of the size of pretraining datasets. All
pretraining datasets have 32× 32 resolution and 10 classes.
Scenario CIFAR-30KTA (%) RA (%) Epochs
(P3,F2) 65.65 30.00 70
(P3,F4) 85.29 49.64 42
Scenario CIFAR-50KTA (%) RA (%) Epochs
(P3,F2) 66.87 30.42 87
(P3,F4) 85.26 49.66 61
Scenario CIFAR-150KTA (%) RA (%) Epochs
(P3,F2) 67.73 30.24 95
(P3,F4) 85.18 50.61 55
Table 8: Ablation results of defense approaches. Instead of adver-
sarial training, we perform random smoothing [5] for pretraining.
Random
Smoothing
Selfie Pretrainng Rotation Pretraining Jigsaw Pretraining
TA (%) RA (%) Epochs TA (%) RA (%) Epochs TA (%) RA (%) Epochs
F2 71.9 30.57 61 74.7 34.23 78 74.66 33.84 68
F4 85.14 50.23 48 85.62 51.25 46 85.18 50.94 46
Ablation of defense approaches in pretraining In Ta-
ble 8, we use random smoothing [5] in place of AT to robus-
tify pretraining, while other protocols remain all unchanged.
We obtain consistent results to using adversarial pretraining:
robust pretraining speed up adversarial fine-tuning and helps
final model robustness, while the full adversarial fine-tuning
contributes the most to the robustness boost.
5. Conclusions
In this paper, we combine adversarial training with self-
supervision to gain robust pretrained models, that can be
readily applied towards downstream tasks through fine-
tuning. We find that adversarial pretraining can not only
boost final model robustness but also speed up the subse-
quent adversarial fine-tuning. We also find adversarial fine-
tuning to contribute the most to the final robustness improve-
ment. Further motivated by our observed diversity among
different self-supervised tasks in pretraining, we propose an
ensemble pretraining strategy that boosts robustness further.
Our results observe consistent gains over state-of-the-art AT
in terms of both standard and robust accuracy, leading to
new benchmark numbers on CIFAR-10. In the future, we are
interested to explore several promising directions revealed
by our experiments and ablation studies, including incorpo-
rating more self-supervised tasks, extending the pretraining
dataset size, and scaling up to high-resolution data.
References
[1] Anish Athalye, Nicholas Carlini, and David Wagner. Obfus-
cated gradients give a false sense of security: Circumventing
defenses to adversarial examples. 2018 ICML, arXiv preprint
arXiv:1802.00420, 2018. 2, 3
[2] Yoshua Bengio, Pascal Lamblin, Dan Popovici, and Hugo
Larochelle. Greedy layer-wise training of deep networks. In
Advances in neural information processing systems, pages
153–160, 2007. 1
[3] Fabio M Carlucci, Antonio D’Innocente, Silvia Bucci, Bar-
bara Caputo, and Tatiana Tommasi. Domain generalization
by solving jigsaw puzzles. In Proceedings of the IEEE Con-
ference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages
2229–2238, 2019. 1, 2, 3
[4] Yair Carmon, Aditi Raghunathan, Ludwig Schmidt, Percy
Liang, and John C Duchi. Unlabeled data improves adver-
sarial robustness. arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13736, 2019.
2
[5] Jeremy M Cohen, Elan Rosenfeld, and J Zico Kolter. Certi-
fied adversarial robustness via randomized smoothing. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1902.02918, 2019. 8
[6] Antonio Criminisi, Patrick Pe´rez, and Kentaro Toyama.
Region filling and object removal by exemplar-based im-
age inpainting. IEEE Transactions on image processing,
13(9):1200–1212, 2004. 1, 2
[7] Guneet S Dhillon, Kamyar Azizzadenesheli, Zachary C Lip-
ton, Jeremy Bernstein, Jean Kossaifi, Aran Khanna, and An-
ima Anandkumar. Stochastic activation pruning for robust
adversarial defense. arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.01442, 2018.
2
[8] Alexey Dosovitskiy, Philipp Fischer, Jost Tobias Springen-
berg, Martin Riedmiller, and Thomas Brox. Discriminative
unsupervised feature learning with exemplar convolutional
neural networks. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis and
machine intelligence, 38(9):1734–1747, 2015. 1, 2
[9] Spyros Gidaris, Praveer Singh, and Nikos Komodakis. Unsu-
pervised representation learning by predicting image rotations.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1803.07728, 2018. 1, 2, 3
[10] Shupeng Gui, Haotao N Wang, Haichuan Yang, Chen Yu,
Zhangyang Wang, and Ji Liu. Model compression with ad-
versarial robustness: A unified optimization framework. In
Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems, pages
1283–1294, 2019. 2
[11] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun.
Deep residual learning for image recognition. In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern
recognition, pages 770–778, 2016. 5
[12] Kaiming He, Xiangyu Zhang, Shaoqing Ren, and Jian Sun.
Identity mappings in deep residual networks. In European
conference on computer vision, pages 630–645. Springer,
2016. 5
[13] Dan Hendrycks and Thomas Dietterich. Benchmarking neural
network robustness to common corruptions and perturbations.
Proceedings of the International Conference on Learning
Representations, 2019. 4, 5
[14] Dan Hendrycks, Mantas Mazeika, Saurav Kadavath, and
Dawn Song. Using self-supervised learning can im-
prove model robustness and uncertainty. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1906.12340, 2019. 1, 3, 5, 6
[15] Geoffrey E Hinton, Simon Osindero, and Yee-Whye Teh. A
fast learning algorithm for deep belief nets. Neural computa-
tion, 18(7):1527–1554, 2006. 1
[16] Ting-Kuei Hu, Tianlong Chen, Haotao Wang, and Zhangyang
Wang. Triple wins: Boosting accuracy, robustness and ef-
ficiency together by enabling input-adaptive inference. In
International Conference on Learning Representations, 2020.
2
[17] Daniel Kang, Yi Sun, Dan Hendrycks, Tom Brown, and Jacob
Steinhardt. Testing robustness against unforeseen adversaries.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1908.08016, 2019. 5, 6
[18] Alexey Kurakin, Ian J. Goodfellow, and Samy Bengio. Ad-
versarial machine learning at scale. CoRR, abs/1611.01236,
2016. 1
[19] Fangzhou Liao, Ming Liang, Yinpeng Dong, Tianyu Pang,
Xiaolin Hu, and Jun Zhu. Defense against adversarial attacks
using high-level representation guided denoiser. In Proceed-
ings of the IEEE Conference on Computer Vision and Pattern
Recognition, pages 1778–1787, 2018. 2
[20] Hong Liu, Mingsheng Long, Jianmin Wang, and Michael I
Jordan. Towards understanding the transferability of deep
representations. arXiv preprint arXiv:1909.12031, 2019. 1
[21] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt,
Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu. Towards deep learning
models resistant to adversarial attacks. 2018 ICLR, arXiv
preprint arXiv:1706.06083, 2018. 1, 2, 3, 5, 6
[22] Dongyu Meng and Hao Chen. Magnet: a two-pronged de-
fense against adversarial examples. In Proceedings of the
2017 ACM SIGSAC Conference on Computer and Communi-
cations Security, pages 135–147. ACM, 2017. 2
[23] Sina Mohseni, Mandar Pitale, JBS Yadawa, and Zhangyang
Wang. Self-supervised learning for generalizable out-of-
distribution detection. AAAI, 2020. 1
[24] Seyed-Mohsen Moosavi-Dezfooli, Alhussein Fawzi, and Pas-
cal Frossard. Deepfool: a simple and accurate method to
fool deep neural networks. In Proceedings of the IEEE Con-
ference on Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition, pages
2574–2582, 2016. 1
[25] Mehdi Noroozi and Paolo Favaro. Unsupervised learning of
visual representations by solving jigsaw puzzles. In European
Conference on Computer Vision, pages 69–84. Springer, 2016.
1, 2, 3
[26] Tianyu Pang, Kun Xu, Chao Du, Ning Chen, and Jun Zhu.
Improving adversarial robustness via promoting ensemble
diversity. arXiv preprint arXiv:1901.08846, 2019. 2, 4
[27] Nicolas Papernot and Patrick McDaniel. Extending defensive
distillation. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.05264, 2017. 2
[28] Rajat Raina, Alexis Battle, Honglak Lee, Benjamin Packer,
and Andrew Y Ng. Self-taught learning: transfer learning
from unlabeled data. In Proceedings of the 24th international
conference on Machine learning, pages 759–766. ACM, 2007.
1
[29] Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Brandon Tran, An-
drew Ilyas, Logan Engstrom, and Aleksander Madry. Com-
puter vision with a single (robust) classifier. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1906.09453, 2019. 4
[30] Ludwig Schmidt, Shibani Santurkar, Dimitris Tsipras, Kunal
Talwar, and Aleksander Madry. Adversarially robust general-
ization requires more data. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 5014–5026, 2018. 1, 8
[31] Robert Stanforth, Alhussein Fawzi, Pushmeet Kohli, et al.
Are labels required for improving adversarial robustness?
arXiv preprint arXiv:1905.13725, 2019. 2
[32] Thilo Strauss, Markus Hanselmann, Andrej Junginger, and
Holger Ulmer. Ensemble methods as a defense to adversarial
perturbations against deep neural networks. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1709.03423, 2017. 2
[33] Antonio Torralba, Rob Fergus, and William T Freeman. 80
million tiny images: A large data set for nonparametric object
and scene recognition. IEEE transactions on pattern analysis
and machine intelligence, 30(11):1958–1970, 2008. 4
[34] Florian Trame`r, Alexey Kurakin, Nicolas Papernot, Dan
Boneh, and Patrick McDaniel. Ensemble adversarial training:
Attacks and defenses. arXiv preprint arXiv:1705.07204, 2017.
2
[35] Trieu H Trinh, Minh-Thang Luong, and Quoc V Le. Selfie:
Self-supervised pretraining for image embedding. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1906.02940, 2019. 1, 2, 3, 5
[36] Pascal Vincent, Hugo Larochelle, Isabelle Lajoie, Yoshua
Bengio, and Pierre-Antoine Manzagol. Stacked denoising
autoencoders: Learning useful representations in a deep net-
work with a local denoising criterion. Journal of machine
learning research, 11(Dec):3371–3408, 2010. 1
[37] Jingkang Wang, Tianyun Zhang, Sijia Liu, Pin-Yu Chen, Jia-
cen Xu, Makan Fardad, and Bo Li. Towards a unified min-max
framework for adversarial exploration and robustness, 2019.
2, 4
[38] Weilin Xu, David Evans, and Yanjun Qi. Feature squeez-
ing: Detecting adversarial examples in deep neural networks.
arXiv preprint arXiv:1704.01155, 2017. 2
[39] Runtian Zhai, Tianle Cai, Di He, Chen Dan, Kun He, John
Hopcroft, and Liwei Wang. Adversarially robust general-
ization just requires more unlabeled data. arXiv preprint
arXiv:1906.00555, 2019. 2
[40] Hongyang Zhang, Yaodong Yu, Jiantao Jiao, Eric P Xing,
Laurent El Ghaoui, and Michael I Jordan. Theoretically
principled trade-off between robustness and accuracy. arXiv
preprint arXiv:1901.08573, 2019. 2, 5
[41] Richard Zhang, Phillip Isola, and Alexei A Efros. Colorful
image colorization. In European conference on computer
vision, pages 649–666. Springer, 2016. 1, 2
[42] Chen Zhu, Yu Cheng, Zhe Gan, Siqi Sun, Tom Goldstein,
and Jingjing Liu. Freelb: Enhanced adversarial training for
natural language understanding. In International Conference
on Learning Representations, 2020. 2
